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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal stems from a lawsuit filed by Plaintiff/Appellant Victoria Johnson in 2006. 
Johnson alleges that her instructor at North Idaho College, Donald Friis, sexually harassed her and 
that North Idaho College ("NIC") is vicariously liable for that harassment. The lawsuit, originally 
filed in state court, was removed to federal court shortly after its filing. There, Johnson's numerous 
federal and state claims against NIC and Friis were subsequently dismissed in their entirety by the 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho. 
However, on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court's dismissal as to one sole claim: Plaintiff's claim of educational discrimination under 
the Idaho Human Rights Act ("IHRA"). The Ninth Circuit found that the federal district court had 
applied the incorrect legal standard to this claim, ruling that, due to the language in the IHRA, 
including the word "agent"in the definition of "educational institution" in Idaho Code§ 67-5902( 10), 
this claim should be evaluated under a Title VII analysis instead of according to Title IX as the 
district court had done. Without making any ruling or comment as to the weight of any evidence in 
this case in support of or contradictory to Johnson's IHRA claim based on a Title VII analysis, the 
Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the U.S. District Court which, in tum, remanded this issue 
back to state court. This sole issue is now before this Court on appeal from the state district court's 
dismissal of that claim on summary judgment. 
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B. Factual and Procedural History 
1. Factual Background1 
In the fall of 2001, Plaintiff Victoria Johnson was enrolled at NIC as a full-time student. 
(Record, p. 190.) That semester, she enrolled in a computer class offered by the college's business 
department, which class was taught by Donald Friis. (R., p. 191.) Ms. Johnson has alleged that at 
some point during this semester Mr. Friis asked her and another female student to breakfast. During 
this breakfast, Ms. Johnson alleges Mr. Friis inquired as to Ms. Johnson's personal relationship 
status, to which Ms.Johnson replied that at that time she wasn't seeing anyone and wasn't interested 
in a personal relationship with anyone because she wanted to focus on her studies. Id.. 
Ms. Johnson alleges that after this breakfast with Mr. Friis, he then became antagonistic 
towards her, sometimes singling her out in class in a negative manner. Id. Ms. Johnson claims that 
because of this negative attention by Mr. Friis she was forced to withdraw from the class without 
completing it. 2 Id. 
Despite the allegations above, Ms. Johnson never notified any employee or official of NIC 
regarding Mr. Friis's actions during the Fall 2001 semester. (R., pp. 191-192.) Ms. Johnson 
admitted at deposition that she never communicated with anyone at NIC about Mr. Friis' s conduct 
during this semester, or the negative impact this conduct allegedly had on her. Id. 
1For an additional detailed and complete factual background of this case, NIC refers this 
Court to the Statement of Facts contained in the Report and Recommendation submitted by U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Candy Dale (Record, pp. 128 through 132), and the Factual and Procedural 
History in Judge Haynes' Memorandum Decision and Order re: Defendant North Idaho College's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R., pp. 274-278). 
2The facts established on summary judgment show that Johnson had numerous other 
reasons for withdrawing from the class at this time. (See R., p. 129, n.3; and R., p. 100.) 
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Ms. Johnson then alleges that in January 2004 she met with her academic advisor, Judy 
Beckendorf, who told Ms. Johnson she needed to take the computer class she had previously 
withdrawn from. Ms. Johnson further alleges that Beckendorf communicated to Johnson that the 
only section available at that time for that class was taught by Don Friis. Despite the mental 
suffering Ms. Johnson claims to have suffered at the hands of Mr. Friis during the Fall 2001 
semester, Ms. Johnson agreed to take this class from Mr. Friis during the Spring 2004 semester with 
full knowledge he would be the instructor. (R., pp. 192-193 .) Ms. Johnson maintains she told 
Beckendorf that Mr. Friis made her uncomfortable, but never told Beckendorf why Mr. Friis made 
her uncomfortable or anything regarding what had allegedly occurred during the Fall 2001 semester. 
Ms. Johnson agreed to take the class from Friis during the Spring 2004 semester. Id. 
Ms. Johnson alleges that during this Spring 2004 class, Mr. Friis was "overly nice" to her. 
(R., p. 193.) Johnson claims Friis touched her on her arm once, which made her feel uncomfortable. 
Id. She also claims he would put his hand on her hand as she held a computer mouse while he was 
showing her something on the computer. Id. 
Ms. Johnson had difficulty with Mr. Friis' s class and at one point during the semester hired 
Mr. Friis's teaching assistant, Sharon Olson, to tutor her in the class material. (R., p. 194.) Despite 
seeking out Mr. Friis for individual help and hiring a tutor, Ms. Johnson struggled with the class 
material. She failed to hand in numerous assignments and was given a "D" for her midterm grade. 
Id. Shortly after this midterm grade, Ms.Johnson asked Mr. Friis ifhe would give her an incomplete 
("I") grade for the class, which would allow her to finish the course material at a later time without 
having to retake the class altogether. Although allowing her an 'T' grade was in violation of NIC 
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grading policies given Johnson's status in his class at that time, Friis nevertheless gave her the "I" 
grade and she stopped attending his class. (R., pp. 194-195.) 
Once Ms. Johnson stopped attending Mr. Friis's class, she claims he began asking her out 
on dates. She claims Mr. Friis called her to ask her out numerous times during the spring and 
summer of 2004, often times leaving messages on her answering machine. At one point, Ms. 
Johnson asserts she told Mr. Friis that if she were to have a personal relationship with someone she 
would have to be friends first, to which he allegedly replied that he was too old to become friends 
first. (R., p. 195.) Ms. Johnson claims that on August 20, 2004, she spoke to Mr. Friis on the phone 
and told him that his actions in asking her out as a student were unethical, and that she didn't want 
him calling her anymore. Ms. Johnson then acknowledges that Mr. Friis ceased contacting her after 
that phone call and has never contacted her since. Id. 
At this point in August 2004, Ms. Johnson admits she still had not contacted any NIC official 
about Mr. Friis's conduct. Although she maintains she told Judy Beckendorf in January 2004 that 
Mr. Friis made her feel uncomfortable, she had never communicated to anyone at the college 
regarding his actions towards her in the Fall 2001 class or the Spring 2004 class. (R., pp. 195-196.) 
Ms. Johnson did notemoll in theFall 2004 semester atNIC. In October 2004, Ms. Johnson's 
grade was automatically changed in the computer class taught by Mr. Friis from an "I" grade to an 
"F" grade because Ms. Johnson failed to complete the required course work by that time. Under 
campus grading policies, Ms. Johnson had six (6) weeks to complete her course work from the 
beginning of the Fall 2004 semester or the grade would automatically be changed to an "F." (R., p. 
196.) Ms. Johnson admits she never completed the course work. Mr. Friis took no part in the action 
to change her grade, as acknowledged by Ms. Johnson. (R., pp. 96-97.) 
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In January 2005, Ms. Johnson met with Judy Bundy, a campus counselor, to discuss getting 
back into school. During this meeting, Ms. Bundy retrieved Johnson's grades on the computer and 
noted that Johnson's grade in Friis's Spring 2004 computer class was an "F." Ms. Johnson believed 
that grade should still be an "I," apparently not knowing the college policies for an "I" grade. Upon 
seeing that her grade was an "F," Johnson mistakenly believed Friis had changed her grade in 
retaliation for her not going on a date with him. At that time-and Johnson admits this was the first 
time-Johnson communicated to Bundy about the alleged actions of Friis in harassing her during the 
Fall 2001 and Spring 2004 semesters. (R., p. 196.) Bundy then contacted theNIC affirmative action 
officer to facilitate Johnson making a formal complaint of sexual harassment against Friis, and 
assisted Ms. Johnson in preparing that complaint, which was submitted to NIC on February 16, 2005. 
(R., pp. 196-197.) 
Upon receiving Ms.Johnson's complaint of sexual harassment, NIC immediately convened 
the Sexual Harassment Advisory Committee ("the SHAC") pursuant to NIC policies and procedures. 
However, NIC policy required Johnson to file a report of sexual harassment within ninety (90) days 
of the alleged occurrence. (R., pp. 97-98.) Johnson, however, waited to report Friis's actions until 
almost six months since her last contact with Friis in August 2004, and more than three years since 
the time of Friis's first alleged harassment in 2001. Despite this, NIC still directed the SHAC to 
convene and address Johnson's allegations against Friis. It did so because it viewed Johnson's 
allegations as a very serious matter and it wanted to ensure that any possible sexual harassment was 
investigated, addressed, and remedied, if necessary. (R., p. 98.) 
As part of its investigation, NIC also notified Friis of the complaint that had been made 
against him and allowed him to respond, also according to policy and procedure. The SHAC then 
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conducted an investigation into the matter, questioning witnesses and reviewing evidence presented 
by both Johnson and Friis. (R., p. 197.) Following the investigation, the SHAC issued a report and 
recommendation to NIC President Michael Burke in May 2005, in which the SHAC laid out its 
findings regarding Johnson's allegations and Friis's actions. The SHAC found that Friis had not 
taken any action in retaliation against Johnson, but that because he could still influence her grade 
during the spring and summer of 2004 it was inappropriate for him to ask Johnson out. The SHAC 
then recommended that President Burke impose the strongest possible penalty against Friis. Upon 
receiving the SHA C's findings and recommendations, President Burke allowed Friis the opportunity 
to resign in lieu of termination. Don Friis then resigned his position with NIC in June 2005. Id. 
Following the resignation of Don Friis, Victoria Johnson filed suit against NIC and Friis. 3 
a. NIC Disputes Johnson's Recitation of Some Key Facts 
Respondent disputes several factual assertions made in Ms. Johnson's Appellant's 
Brief, which NIC will address in its briefing below. However, one material allegation made by 
Johnson requires discussion here. Specifically, on page 3 of the Appellant's Brief Johnson states: 
"Throughout, Friis indicated that her grade could be affected by her response to his actions." 
Johnson provides no citation to the record for this assertion, and in fact there is no evidence that Friis 
ever made such indications to Johnson. To the contrary, the record contains evidence-in the form 
of Johnson's own deposition testimony-that any fears of retaliation by Friis Johnson had were her 
3Johnson originally filed suit in September 2006. This was after she had filed a Charge of 
Discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on May 26, 2005. (R., p. 63.) Thus, 
under Idaho Code§§ 67-5907(1) and 67-5908(2), all alleged actions by Friis taken prior to 
May 26, 2004 fall outside the applicable statute of limitations for Johnson's IHRA claims. These 
actions include any taken while Johnson was attending class with Friis, both in 2001 and 2004. 
See U.S. Magistrate Judge Dale's Report and Recommendation, R., pp. 134-135 (finding statute 
of limitations precludes claims related to 2001 semester). 
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own subjective fears and not based on any action Friis had ever taken. This is a significant and 
central point to this appeal. The District Court below specifically found there was no evidence of 
a threat of retaliation by Friis other than Johnson's own subjective beliefs. (R., p. 275; Transcript 
of January 11, 2011 Decision, p. 9: 10-204.) The U.S. Magistrate found the same undisputed 
evidence on Johnson's Title IX claims. (R., p. 129, n.2.) Johnson herself has pointed to no such 
evidence that Friis ever communicated a retaliatory intent to her. In short, there is no evidence in 
the Record supporting this allegation. 
2. Procedural History 
This case was originally filed in 2006 in the First District Court of Idaho. Plaintiff named 
NIC and Friis as defendants. Those Defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Idaho based on the federal questions raised in Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendants 
thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's tort claims on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to 
adhere to the requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code Title 6, Chapter 9. The U.S. 
District Court subsequently granted this Motion (R., pp. 88-92), leaving only Plaintiff's 
discrimination claims under Title IX and the Idaho Human Rights Act. Following discovery, 
Defendants filed for summary judgment on these remaining claims, which was granted on 
August 28, 2008, when U.S. District Judge Edward Lodge adopted U.S. Magistrate Judge Candy 
Dale's Report and Recommendation. (R., pp. 151-152.) 
4The District Court held at this citation: "The facts that this Court is aware of and is in the 
record before the Court is that plaintiff has essentially admitted that her fear of retaliation from 
Mr. Friis was completely subjective. That he did not say he would retaliate against her. He did 
not threaten her in that way. He may have certainly engaged in sexually harassing behavior to 
her, but he articulated no threat to her should she choose to report it. She simply subjectively 
believed that there was a risk of retaliation if she did report." 
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Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of all of her claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims except her claim for 
educational discrimination under the IHRA. (R., pp. 154-158.) The Ninth Circuit held that because 
of the inclusion of the word "agent" in the definition of an educational institution in Idaho Code § 
67-5902(10), an IHRA educational discrimination claim should be evaluated under a Title VII 
analysis instead of according to Title IX as the federal district court had done. 
The Ninth Circuit then remanded that claim back to the U.S. District Court which, in turn, 
remanded the case back to Idaho state court (R., pp. 160-165). Plaintiff did not file a petition for writ 
of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court to appeal the Ninth Circuit's upholding of the dismissal 
of her other claims. Thus, those claims are permanently decided. Further, because the dismissal of 
all claims relating to Friis was upheld by the Ninth Circuit, Friis is no longer an active party to this 
proceeding. 
Upon remand to state court, Defendant NIC filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
remaining IHRA claim, raising the affirmative defense established in the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and its companion case, 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 77 5 (1998). This affirmative defense precludes a 
finding of Title VII liability against an employer when a supervisor has sexually harassed a 
subordinate when certain requirements are met. As applied to this present case, those requirements 
are met when, as a precondition, there has been no adverse employment action taken against the 
employee by the supervisor (or, by the legal analogy established by the Ninth Circuit, no adverse 
educational action was taken against Johnson by Friis). If the precondition is met, then NIC must 
prove that: (1) NIC took reasonable care in preventing and correcting the sexually harassing 
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behavior, and (2) Johnson unreasonably failed to utilize the NIC procedures and processes for 
reporting discrimination and thus deprived NIC of the opportunity to address and stop the harassing 
behavior before it became discriminatory. Under the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, if NIC 
can prove each of these requirements, it is not liable for Friis' s allegedly harassing behavior. 
Upon hearing NIC's Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court initially determined 
that NIC had met the first prong of the F aragher/Ellerth affirmative defense (that NIC took 
reasonable care in preventing and correcting the sexually harassing behavior), but that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the second prong as to whether Johnson unreasonably failed 
to report Friis's harassment out of a fear of retaliation. (R., pp. 274-282.) NIC thereafter filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration on the second prong of the affirmative defense, arguing that a subjective, 
unsupported fear of retaliation standing alone with no other supporting evidence is, as a matter of 
law, insufficient to constitute a reasonable failure to report harassing behavior. Upon hearing NIC' s 
Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court granted that Motion, vacated its Memorandum 
Decision denying NIC's Motion for Summary Judgment, granted that Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and dismissed the case. Johnson now appeals from that decision. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the same 
standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for 
summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." The burden is on the moving party to show that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact. "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question 
of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." 
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Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 101 (Idaho 2009). On summary judgment 
the nonmoving "plaintiff's case must be anchored in something more than speculation and a mere 
scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue." G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 
Idaho 514,517 (1991). Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has established what material facts are on 
summary judgment: 
As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only 
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are 
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. This materiality inquiry is independent 
of and separate from the question of the incorporation of the evidentiary standard into 
the summary judgment determination. That is, while the materiality determination 
rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law's identification of which facts 
are irrelevant that governs. Any proof or evidentiary requirements imposed by the 
substantive law are not germane to this inquiry, since materiality is only a criterion 
for categorizing factual disputes in their relation to the legal elements of the claim 
and not a criterion for evaluating the evidentiary underpinning of those disputes. 
Again, in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., the Court emphasized that the availability of 
summary judgment turned on whether a proper jury question was presented. 
As Adickes, supra, and Cities Service, supra, indicate, there is no issue for trial 
unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return 
a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly 
probative, summary judgment may be granted. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986) (citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently stated that Idaho Code§ 67-5901 (the statement 
of purpose of the Idaho Human Rights Act) "allows our state courts to look to federal law for 
guidance when interpreting the Idaho Human Rights Act." Stout v. Key Training Corp., 144 Idaho 
195, 197 (2007). 
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III. 
ARGUlVIENT 
A. The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Johnson's Idaho Human 
Rights Act Claim 
1. The Legal Analysis of Plaintiff's IHRA Claim 
In her Amended Complaint Johnson makes a claim for educational discrimination under the 
Idaho Human Rights Act, Idaho Code § 67-5901 et seq. (R., pp. 76-85.) Johnson alleges that the 
Defendants caused an adverse educational action against her in violation of Title IX and the Idaho 
Human Rights Act. (R., pp. 82-83.) Idaho Code§ 67-5909(7)(a) makes it illegal for an educational 
institution in Idaho to "exclude, expel, limit, or otherwise discriminate against an individual seeking 
admission as a student or an individual enrolled as a student in the terms, conditions, and privileges 
of the institution .... " 
In federal court, the U.S. Magistrate Judge analyzed Johnson's IHRA claim under the 
structure of Title IX, given that Johnson was making an educational discrimination claim. This 
analysis was supported by Johnson's own amended complaint, which alleged that NIC had actual 
notice ofFriis's conduct and that NIC showed deliberate indifference to Friis's conduct upon actual 
notice thereof. (R., p. 82.) These are the very two requirements a plaintiff must show under Title 
IX in order to prevail on an education discrimination claim. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent 
School Dist., 524 U.S. 274,292 (1989); Mansourian v. Regents of California, 602 F.3d 957,967 (9th 
Cir. 2010). Because U.S. Magistrate Judge Dale dismissed Johnson's Title IX claim for failing to 
provide evidence of these elements on summary judgment, Judge Dale likewise dismissed Johnson's 
IHRA claims, noting the lack of Idaho law indicating that an educational discrimination claim under 
the IHRA should be handled any differently than a Title IX claim. 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed. In its decision (R., pp. 154-158), 
that court held that because the definition of an educational institution in the IHRA (Idaho Code § 
67-5902(10)) contains the language "and includes an agent of an educational institution," "[s]uch 
language provides for respondeat superior liability." (R., p. 157.) Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that 
an educational discrimination claim under the IHRA should be analyzed under a Title VII structure, 
not Title IX (which does not provide for respondeat superior liability). The Ninth Circuit remanded 
the case back to the U.S. District Court with no ruling or comment as to whether the evidence on 
summary judgment supported or contradicted a finding for Johnson under a Title VII analysis. In 
tum, the U.S. District Court remanded the case back to Idaho district court finding that "application 
of the IHRA in the context of educational discrimination has not been, as far as the Court is aware, 
the subject of jurisprudence by the Idaho Supreme Court or Idaho Court of Appeals." (R., p. 162.) 
To the extent this Court finds that the Ninth Circuit erred in interpreting the IHRA to provide 
for respondeat superior liability for an educational discrimination claim, NIC asserts that, just as 
Judge Dale found on Johnson's Title IX claims, Johnson has failed to show that NIC had actual 
notice of Friis' s actions prior to January 2005. And, upon learning of Friis' s behavior, NIC took 
prompt, effective, and appropriate action in addressing the behavior. As such, under a Title IX 
analysis Johnson's claims must fail. 
However, if this Court adopts the Ninth Circuit's reasoning requiring a Title VII respondeat 
superior analysis, then NIC asserts that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its claims 
under the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense that is available in a Title VII context, and that 
Johnson has failed to meet her burden under this affirmative defense to enable her claims to survive 
to trial. 
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2. The Faragher/Ellerth Affirmative Defense 
The U.S. Supreme Court has established: 
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an 
actionable hostile work environment created by a supervisor with immediate ( or 
successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment 
action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or 
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The defense 
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). The Faragher Court further stated: 
While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with 
complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need 
for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be 
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while 
proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable 
care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any 
complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will 
normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the 
defense. 
Id. at 807-08. 
Here, because, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's reading of the IHRA, the parties are called 
upon to analogize and apply a Title VII standard to an education-based IHRA claim, case law exists 
suggesting that in this analogy Donald Friis should be treated as if he were Johnson's supervisor in 
this situation. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (holding that 
the same rule prohibiting a supervisor sexually harassing a subordinate "should apply when a teacher 
sexually harasses [] a student"). Where the relationship between Friis and Johnson cannot be 
reasonably described as peer-to-peer, and absent more instructive language, the parties and the 
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District Court have approached this issue assuming Friis is to be treated as Johnson's supervisor 
under a Title VII analysis. 
In analyzing NIC' s invocation of this affirmative defense in this case, it is important to set 
forth the rationale behind the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. This defense is an affirmative 
defense to a claim of respondeat superior liability for sexual harassment. In this setting, NIC is 
contending that it never had notice of Friis' s alleged harassment of Johnson until an actual report of 
harassment was made in January 2005, to which NIC responded quickly, effectively, and 
appropriately. The two elements of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense are that: (1) NIC had 
policies and procedures in place to address claims of harassment and took appropriate action upon 
receiving a report of harassment, and (2) Johnson unreasonably failed to utilize the procedures 
available to her. Thus, Faragher is meant to provide a means by which the employer-or NIC, in this 
case by legal analogy-can stop and mitigate any harm that is occurring as a result of the harassment 
of one of its employees before that behavior becomes severe or pervasive. By providing an anti-
harassment policy and making sure its students and staff were well aware of it, NIC was 
affirmatively establishing its opposition to such harassment and notifying students and staff how they 
could report the harassment to NIC and allow NIC to end the harassment. 
However, in order for the harassment to truly be stopped, Faragher then places the 
responsibility upon the victim to come forth and report the harassment promptly so that NIC can then 
take steps to stop it. If the victim fails to take advantage of the processes afforded by NIC, then 
under Faragher/Ellerth NIC cannot be held liable for the harassment (if it did not otherwise know 
about it). See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1178 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
second prong of Faragher/Ellerth "is intended to fulfill a policy imported from the general theory 
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of damages, that a victim has a duty to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances 
to avoid or minimize the damages that result from violations of the statute") ( emphasis added). 5 
This is why the second prong of Faragher/Ellerth is typically satisfied by a showing that the 
employee failed to utilize the employer's complaint procedure. Id.; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
807-08. This is key, because if the victim does not promptly report the harassment, NIC cannot 
mitigate the harm done by the harasser. Thus, Faragher/Ellerth shields NIC from any liability for 
damages that would not have occurred had the victim promptly reported the harassment. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the second Faragher prong as 
follows: 
The rules of [Faragher and Ellerth] place obligations and duties not only on the 
employer but also on the employee. One of the primary obligations that the 
employee has under those rules is to take full advantage of the employer's 
preventative measures. The genius of the Faragher-Ellerth plan is that the 
corresponding duties it places on the employers and employees are designed to stop 
sexual harassment before it reaches the severe or pervasive stage amounting to 
discrimination in violation of Title VII. But that design only works if employees 
report harassment promptly, earlier instead of later, and the sooner the better. 
Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1306-07 (1 I th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added). In other words, the employee-or in this case, Johnson-hinders and even nullifies the very 
protections created for her when she fails to promptly report the harassing behavior directed towards 
her. 
5Defendant NIC cites to federal case law analyzing Faragher and Ellerth because there 
are no Idaho state court cases dealing with the same to Defendant's knowledge. Further, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently stated that Idaho Code§ 67-5901 (the statement of 
purpose of the Idaho Human Rights Act) "allows our state courts to look to federal law for 
guidance when interpreting the Idaho Human Rights Act." Stout v. Key Training Corp., 144 
Idaho 195, 197 (2007). 
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The structure of the Faragher/Ellerth defense is stacked solidly in favor of Johnson. In order 
to qualify for its protections NIC must have in place policies and procedures to protect individuals 
from harassment; it must effectively and appropriately address harassment as soon as it is brought 
to NIC's attention; and it must show that Johnson unreasonably failed to take advantage of the 
policies and procedures that protected her. Add to this the prerequisite to the defense that there must 
not have been any adverse educational action taken against Johnson, and there are a total of four 
separate elements that NIC must prove in order to qualify for this preclusion from liability. A failure 
to prove any of these elements prevents NIC from obtaining this end. 
On the other hand, all Johnson was required to do was to take advantage of NIC's reporting 
procedures in a timely manner. Had she done so, NIC would be disqualified from invoking 
F aragher/Ellerth. But as the District Court correctly concluded, Johnson failed to do so as a matter 
of law. And Johnson's failure to timely report the harassment prevented NIC from fulfilling its 
designated functions under the Title VII analysis in preventing and correcting any harassing behavior 
by Friis before it became so pervasive as to amount to discrimination. Bearing in mind that Johnson 
alleges harassment from a period of time ranging from the Fall 2001 semester until August 2004 
(which is the last contact Johnson ever had with Friis), waiting until January 2005 to report Friis's 
behavior plainly prevented NIC from taking any action that could have prevented further harassment. 
Had Johnson complied with Title VII by immediately reporting the alleged harassment as soon as 
it began in 2001, all harassment and alleged damages that occurred after that report could have been 
avoided. 
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3. There Was No Adverse Educational Action Taken by Friis 
As directed by Faragher/Ellerth, NIC bears vicarious liability for Friis's actions outright if 
Johnson suffered what can be deemed to be the educational equivalent of an adverse employment 
action (i.e., in an employment context, "discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment," 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808) at the hands of Friis. In this case, Johnson suffered no such comparable 
adverse action at the hands of Friis. Johnson's main grievance against Friis was that he asked her 
out on dates and gave her unwanted attention, and that he was "overly nice" to her. (R., pp. 193.) 
Johnson admits that Friis' s asking her out on dates occurred outside of the classroom. She likewise 
admits that Friis never threatened to take any adverse action against her if she declined his requests. 
Johnson suffered no adverse grade or other significant educational action as a result of Friis's 
behavior. 
To the contrary, in this respect Johnson's education actually-though improperly-benefitted 
from Friis's attention, where Friis violated NIC policy for Johnson's benefit in the spring of 2004 
when he allowed her to receive an "I" incomplete grade when Johnson was not qualified to receive 
that grade upon her leaving school mid-semester. Had Friis complied with NIC policy, he would not 
have given her the "I" grade, and by dropping out mid-semester Johnson would have ultimately 
received an "F" for the class, particularly where her grade at mid-term was a D. Likewise, had 
Johnson done the work over the summer to finish the course work in Friis's class by the October 
deadline, she could have obtained a passing grade despite the fact her temporary "I" grade was 
contrary to campus policy. 
Yet Johnson claims that the change in her grade from an "I" to an "F" in October 2004 
constitutes an adverse educational action that should preclude F aragher/Ellerth protection to NIC. 
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(App. Br., pp. 13-14.) Johnson argues that "a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that the 'I' 
grade being changed to an 'F,' as a direct and proximate result of Friis's conduct, constituted an 
adverse action, which would preclude Respondent NIC's invocation of the Affirmative Defense." 
Id. This assertion is contrary to Johnson's own testimony, where she acknowledged that when this 
"I" grade changed to an "F" in October 2004, this change had nothing to do with Friis, but rather 
occurred automatically because Johnson had not finished any of the required work in that class by 
the preset deadline. (R., p. 40; Johnson Deposition Vol. I, pp. 184: 12 - 185: 11.) This admission is 
born out by the very evidence established by NIC. (R., pp. 96-97.) Johnson has offered no evidence 
to the contrary. 
Thus, Johnson has failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact as to whether she 
suffered an adverse education action because of Friis. Her claim that a rational trier of fact could 
link the grade change to Friis is supported by no evidence in the record whatsoever, and is flatly 
contradicted by evidence that includes her own admission. As such, NIC is entitled to invoke the 
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. 
4. There Is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact That NIC Exercised Reasonable 
Care to Prevent and Correct Promptly Any Sexually Harassing Behavior 
In its original decision on summary judgment, the District Court found: "The record before 
this Court is clear that NIC took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct such an alleged 
discriminatory situation." (R., p. 281.) This finding is fully supported by the evidence on summary 
judgment and the relevant law governing this first Faragher/Ellerth prong. 
a. NIC Took Reasonable Care in Preventing Harassment 
First, NIC had a well-known anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure, and 
NIC provided sexual harassment training to all faculty and staff on a regular basis. This policy was 
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part of the NIC student handbook available to all students, and was available online. (R., p. 99.) 
Training was given to faculty and staff on a regular basis. Id. In investigating Johnson's complaints 
of discrimination, the Idaho Human Rights Commission observed that NIC held a sexual harassment 
workshop for staff in 2004 and an information session about it for students in 2005. (R., p. 73.) 
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Faragher: "While proof that an employer had 
promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance 
as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may 
appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense." 524 U.S. 
at 807. See also Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding "AGCO's 
policy and its efforts to ensure all employees were aware of the policy establishes that AGCO 
exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment in its workplace"). 
Johnson provided no evidence on summary judgment to contradict the District 
Court's findings on this part of the first prong. As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
as to this element of the first prong. 
b. NIC Took Reasonable Care to Promptly Correct Harassment 
Further, evidence shows that NIC also exercised reasonable care to correct promptly 
sexually harassing behavior. When a male student made an informal complaint about Friis invading 
his personal space in early 2004, NIC addressed this situation promptly and directly by approaching 
Friis about it, warning him, and requiring him to attend sensitivity training classes that same 
semester. (R., p. 98.) This was done in response to the student's informal, unwritten complaint and 
in a situation that NIC deemed to not be sexual harassment. This evidences NIC' s policy and 
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practice of taking all allegations of harassment seriously and taking swift action to address and 
correct any harassment. 
More so, Johnson's own case provides an even better example of these policies and 
practices. When Johnson finally told Judy Bundy-an academic counselor-that Friis had harassed 
her, Bundy's response was that she was obligated to report it to the NIC administration. (R., p. 41; 
Johnson Depo. Vol. I, p. 205:21-24.) This is exactly what Bundy did, and NIC's affirmative action 
officer, Brenda Smith (who was designated by NIC to receive sexual harassment complaints), 
immediately met with Johnson, interviewed her, and then helped facilitate Johnson filing her written 
complaint of harassment against Friis. Smith then convened the Sexual Harassment Advisory 
Committee ("SHAC") to investigate the allegations. 
Significantly, NIC took these actions despite the fact that Johnson had failed to abide 
by NIC's policies with regard to timely reporting harassment. These policies required Johnson to 
report the harassment within ninety (90) days of the harassing activity. (R., p. 112.) As shown 
above, Johnson's report was filed between five months and over three years after Friis's alleged 
actions. Yet despite this untimely report, NIC determined to investigate the allegations because NIC 
viewed the allegations as a very serious matter and because it wanted to ensure any possible sexual 
harassment was investigated, addressed and remedied, if necessary. (R., pp. 97-98.) 
Upon convening, the five member SHAC immediately set about to investigate 
Johnson's allegations. In doing so, it interviewed several witnesses, including Johnson and Friis, 
and it reviewed documentation relevant to Johnson's claims. It then issued a nine page decision 
detailing its findings and issuing a recommendation to NIC President Burke. (R., pp. 118-126.) This 
recommendation-for the strongest possible sanction that will protect students, both present and 
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future-was adopted by President Burke, who offered Friis the option of resigning his teaching 
position in lieu of termination. 
Johnson first reported the harassment to Judy Bundy in January 2005, and soon after 
that she met with Brenda Smith. (R., p. 95.) After taking some time to consider her options (R., p. 
95), Johnson filed her written complaint of harassment on February 16, 2005. (R., pp. 100-105.) 
The SHAC issued its findings on May 10, 2005, a little over three months later. Friis resigned in 
early June 2005. (R., p. 97.) Thus, from the time Johnson filed her report of harassment, NIC took 
quick, decisive action by following its own preestablished procedures in giving Friis notice, 
convening the SHAC, and having the SHAC investigate the allegations and issue its findings. Soon 
after that Friis was no longer employed by NIC. These actions by NIC clearly show that it exercised 
reasonable care to correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior as required by the first prong. 6 
Contrary to Appellant's bald claim that "despite being placed on notice of Respondent Friis' s 
behavior, Respondent NIC failed to take any action," (App. Br., p. 9), the evidence speaks wholly 
to the contrary. 
c. Johnson's Claims to the Contrary Do Not Create a Genuine Issue of 
Material Fact on Summary Judgment 
Johnson claims in her Appellant's Brief that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
as to the first prong of Faragher/Ellerth due to the following issues: (1) the male student who 
complained that Friis was invading his space in 2004; and (2) reports of allegedly inappropriate 
conduct involving Friis that were raised while the SHAC was investigating Johnson's complaint. 
Both issues fail to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
6See Judge Dale's Report and Recommendation, R., p. 142, in which she finds NIC's 
actions in responding to Johnson's complaint of harassment were proper. 
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As to the male student, as has been shown above, NIC's response to this student's 
oral, informal complaint was substantial and immediate. Brenda Smith (the NIC HR officer) 
immediately addressed this issue with Friis, warned him, and required him to attend sensitivity 
training. (R., p. 98.) This was despite the fact that Smith determined that the actions complained 
of did not constitute sexual harassment. Id. No further complaint or issue regarding this was ever 
raised again. Yet Johnson asserts that this incident involving a male student in another class is 
evidence that NIC did not promptly correct the sexual harassment she alleges involved her and Friis, 
which is contrary to the Faragher/Ellerth standard. The male student did not allege that Friis was 
asking him out on dates, touching him, or behaving in any manner similar to what Johnson has 
alleged. Given this, NIC could not have reasonably been put on notice of Friis's alleged behavior 
with Johnson through this male student's informal report. 7 
Further, Johnson claims that "NIC did no follow-up in order to ensure that such 
behavior was not continuing; No one was sent to Friis's classroom to observe or monitor his 
interaction with the students" ( emphasis in original). There are several flaws with this assertion. 
First, Johnson fails to provide any authority or precedent that even implicitly requires an educational 
institution to physically monitor an employee against whom a complaint of invading a student's 
personal space has been made. Johnson fails to provide anything that supports her insistence that 
NIC should have paid someone to attend Friis' s classes and make sure he was not invading other 
students' personal space based on one informal report. On the other hand, Johnson also disregards 
7U.S. Magistrate Judge Dale agreed, finding "it is logical to conclude that a complaint by 
a male student that Friis was invading his space does not put NIC on notice that there was a 
substantial risk that Friis was sexually harassing female students by asking them out and touching 
them inappropriately." (R., pp. 140-141.) 
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the affirmative actions NIC did take in requiring Friis to attend sensitivity training in response to the 
report, and she ignores the fact that this one report was singular and isolated and that no other similar 
reports were ever received against Friis. (R., pp. 98-99.) 
More so, the evidence Johnson points to in order to attempt to prove that no one 
monitored Friis is the Affidavit of Michelle Cook, a student who, by her own sworn statement, only 
attended Friis' s class in the fall of 2001 (R., p. 231), and therefore would not have been present in 
Friis's Spring 2004 class when any observation would have been made based on the male student's 
report. Johnson herself stopped attending Friis's class midway during the Spring 2004 semester and 
likewise would not have been present to witness such monitoring. 
As additional support for her argument that NIC did not take reasonable action to 
promptly correct harassment, Johnson alleges that "Michelle Cook had been subject to similar 
treatment at the hands of Friis.'' (App. Br., p. 10.) Yet Cook was only a student of Friis's in 2001; 
her affidavit merely states that Friis was flirtatious with her and asked her to breakfast; and nowhere 
in this affidavit does Cook ever even imply she gave NIC any notice about any of this. (R., pp. 231-
232.) Accordingly, Cook's affidavit fails to provide any evidence that NIC ever failed to act 
reasonably in correcting claims of harassment upon receiving them. The assertion is wholly without 
merit. 
And, Johnson claims reports by staff regarding Friis that were received while the 
SHAC was investigating Johnson's claims prove that NIC failed to take reasonable action to 
promptly correct harassing behavior. Significantly, these reports-two memos by separate NIC 
faculty members made in April 2005--detail how they witnessed Friis's inappropriately touching a 
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female student on the leg and the arm. (R., pp. 247-248.) Johnson now claims that, "Yet NIC, once 
again, failed to take additional action." (App. Br., p. 10.) This assertion is frivolous. 
As the evidence plainly shows, in April 2005 the SHAC had already begun its 
investigation into Friis based on Johnson's complaint. By that time NIC was already fully aware of 
Johnson's similar allegations against Friis and was working directly to address and correct them. 
Johnson's assertion that NIC failed to act on these new reports is disingenuous, where NIC was at 
that very time taking significant action against Friis that soon after resulted in his losing his 
employment with NIC. 
On summary judgment Johnson is required to bring forth affirmative evidence that 
establishes a genuine issue of material fact as the first Faragher/Ellerth prong, and she failed to do 
so. The evidence is undisputed that NIC had clear and well-communicated policies and procedures 
in place to prohibit and report sexual harassment, and that when NIC received notice of such 
harassment it took immediate, effective, and appropriate steps to deal with it. The questions Johnson 
raises as to the male student's informal report, Michelle Cook's affidavit, and the reports by faculty 
in April 2005, do not relate to the material facts at hand on summary judgment, and they do not 
constitute evidence that establishes a genuine issue of those material facts to preclude summary 
judgment here. 
5. There is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact that Johnson Unreasonably Failed 
to Report Friis's Actions as Required by Faragher/Ellerth 
The second prong of Faragher/Ellerth requires NIC to prove that Johnson unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities offered by NIC to avoid harm 
otherwise. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. In that case the U.S. Supreme Court held: "And while proof 
that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is 
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not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the 
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden 
under the second element of the defense." Id. at 807-08. 
In this case, Victoria Johnson waited until well after Friis' s behavior towards her had stopped 
completely before she reported it to NIC. Johnson claims Friis began his harassment of her in the 
Fall 2001 semester, and then again during the Spring 2004 semester, and during the summerof2004. 
In August 2004, Johnson communicated her disapproval of Friis 's behaviortohim,8 after which Friis 
never contacted her again. Then,five months transpired during which there was no contact between 
Friis and Johnson, let alone any harassing behavior. Thus, when Johnson finally reported Friis's 
behavior to NIC there was no longer any ongoing harassment to curtail. The damage had already 
been done, and NIC had no way of stopping it. See Mukaida v. Hawaii, 159 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1231 
(D.Hawaii 2001) (observing "[b]ecause she waited until the harassment had ended, [the plaintiff] 
never gave the State or UH an opportunity to correct the alleged sexual harassment," finding the 
plaintiff's delay in reporting unreasonable). 
In response to NIC' s assertion of the second prong, Johnson first claims that she did report 
Friis's harassment prior to January 2005. Johnson cites to one or more occasions when she 
communicated to NIC staff members that Friis made her uncomfortable. (App. Br., p. 12.) 
However, telling an NIC employee that Friis made her feel uncomfortable does not amount to a 
report of sexual harassment. These statements by Johnson were not made utilizing NIC's sexual 
8The record shows this was the only time Johnson communicated her disapproval to Friis 
of his alleged behavior. While NIC does not assert that Johnson's failure to do so previously 
excused Friis's behavior, it cannot be argued that Friis ever disregarded Johnson's requests that 
he stop his actions. Following Johnson's sole request that Friis stop contacting her, Friis never 
did so again. 
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harassment reporting procedures; rather, they were made in passing to a counselor and a teaching 
assistant on separate occasions, neither of whom had reason to understand that Johnson was talking 
about sexual harassment, let alone that she was reporting it. These statements cannot be deemed to 
be reasonable efforts at notification. See Hill v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639,643 (7tli Cir. 
2000) (holding that employee's anonymous letters to employer complaining of sexual harassment 
were not reasonable efforts at notification). Such statements did not give NIC actual notice of Friis' s 
alleged conduct.9 As the Ninth Circuit found: "[N]o reasonable juror could conclude that NIC had 
notice of Friis's conduct prior to February 2005." (R., p. 157.) 
Further, these statements-and those NIC employees' failure to discern complaints of sexual 
harassment from them-did not give Johnson any valid basis for believing that if she were to give an 
actual report of sexual harassment to NIC, that NIC wouldn't do anything about it. See App. Br., 
p. 12 (arguing that Johnson's statements of being uncomfortable "provided a sufficiently credible 
basis for Appellant to believe that further complaint would be futile"). To the contrary, when 
Johnson actually gave a report of sexual harassment to NIC, action was quickly taken that resulted 
in Friis' s termination of employment. 
As such, Johnson never reported Friis's alleged sexual harassment to NIC prior to January 
2005 when she gave specific information to Judy Bundy detailing Friis's behavior. At no time 
before that point did Johnson ever make a report of sexual harassment. Thus, the question becomes 
whether Johnson's failure to report Friis' s behavior until January 2005 constitutes an unreasonable 
9Judge Dale found: "A comment made by a student that her professor makes her 
'uncomfortable,' without more detail, cannot be equated to a complaint of sexual harassment." 
R., p. 140. See also R., pp. 137-141, finding NIC did not have actual notice of Johnson's claims 
prior to January 2005. 
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failure to comply with NIC's reporting procedures under the second Faragher/Ellerth prong. It is 
NIC' s position-adopted by the District Court below-that Johnson's failure to report Friis' s conduct 
until January 2005 was unreasonable as a matter of law under the numerous federal cases that have 
analyzed similar factual cases, and that accordingly the District Court properly granted NIC summary 
judgment on the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. 
a. A Generalized. Unsubstantiated Fear of Retaliation Is. as a Matter of 
Law, an Unreasonable Cause for Delay 
Johnson asserts that she delayed reporting Friis' s behavior because she believed Friis 
may take some retaliatory action towards her if she did so. (App. Br., p. 12.) An example of this 
fear of retaliation is Johnson's fear that Friis may take away her "I" grade if she reported him. 
Indeed, many plaintiffs facing the Faragher affirmative defense claim that they delayed reporting 
or never reported the harassment against them out of fear of retaliation by the harasser. And yet 
courts dealing with this issue have consistently held that as a matter of law fear of retaliation alone 
is unreasonable under the Faragher second prong. The Eleventh Circuit in Baldwin held: 
Baldwin (the plaintiff) waited too long to complain. Her complaint 
came three months and two weeks after the first proposition incident 
and three months and one week after the second one. That is 
anything but prompt, early, or soon. Baldwin argues that her delay in 
reporting the harassment was reasonable because she had good 
reasons for not doing so sooner. An employee in extreme cases may 
have reasons for not reporting harassment earlier that are good 
enough to excuse the delay, but the ones that Baldwin puts forth are 
not. Baldwin says that she waited to file her complaint until 
November 8, 2001-three months after the solicitation in Head's 
office at the very end of July-because she feared being fired and felt 
silence would best serve her career interests. Her goal, she testified, 
was to '~ust go along to get along." While we have recognized that 
filing a sexual harassment complaint may be "uncomfortable, scary, 
or both," we have also explained that "the problem of workplace 
discrimination ... cannot be corrected without the cooperation of the 
victims." The Faragher and Elle rth decisions present employees who 
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are victims of harassment with a hard choice: assist the prevention of 
harassment by promptly reporting it to the employer, or lose the 
opportunity to successfully prosecute a Title VII claim based on 
harassment. Every employee could say, as Baldwin does, that she did 
not report the harassment earlier for fear of losing her job or 
damaging her career prospects. As the First Circuit has explained, the 
Supreme Court undoubtedly realized as much when it designed the 
Faragher-Ellerth defense, but it nonetheless decided to require an 
employee to make the choice in favor of ending harassment if she 
wanted to impose vicarious liability on her employer. Were it 
otherwise, the Faragher-Ellerth defense would be largely optional 
with plaintiffs, and it would be essentially useless in furthering the 
important public policy of preventing sexual harassment. 
Id. Indeed, the court in Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262,267 (4th Cir. 2001) 
observed that "[b ]y advancing a speculative 'fearofretaliation' excuse for remaining silent, Barrett's 
argument would undermine the primary objective of Title VII and could result in more, not less, 
sexual harassment going undetected." In other words, by not reporting the harassment, the plaintiff 
wholly undermines the protective measures of Title VII. 
Numerous other courts across the jurisdictions have found the same. See Adams v. 
0 'Reilly Automotive, Inc., 538 F.3d 926, 932-33 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding"[ w ]e do not believe that 
a fear of retaliation is generally a proper excuse for failing to report sexual harassment" and "[t]o 
excuse a victim from the duty to alert the proper authorities through proper channels specifically 
discourages the best hope of exposing and eliminating sexual harassment [] [and] [n]ormally 
bringing a retaliation claim, rather than failing to report sexual harassment, is the appropriate 
response to the possibility of retaliation"); Jernigan v. Alderwoods Group, Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d 1180 
(D.Oregon 2007) (holding "an employee's subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or 
retaliation do not alleviate the employee's duties under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly 
hostile environment") citing Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999); Beyer v. 
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Baker School Dist., 2005 WL 35193 6 * 8 (D. Oregon) ("a generalized fear of retaliation cannot justify 
a failure to report sexual harassment"); Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1228 
(M.D.Fla. 2004) (finding "subjective fears of reprisal may exist in every case, but those fears, 
standing alone, do not excuse an employee's failure to report a supervisor's harassment"); Verges 
v. Shelby County Sherif.f's Office, 2010 WL 2696764 * 10 (W.D. Tenn.) (holding that a "generalized 
fear of retaliation unaccompanied by any objective evidence to substantiate that fear, however, is, 
as a matter of law, insufficient to justify an employee's failure to comply with a reporting policy"); 
E.E.O.C. v. Restaurant Co., 490 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1049 (D.Minn. 2007) (holding "an employee's 
subjective fears of retaliation do not alleviate the employee's duty to alert the employer to the 
harassment"); see also Lyle v. ESPN Zone, 292 F.Supp.2d 758 (D.Maryland 2003); Clark v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 819 (W.D.Ky. 2003), overturned on other grounds; and Murray 
v. Chicago TransitAuth., 252 F.3d 880 (7 th Cir. 2001) (holding "[a]lthoughMurray claims shefeared 
further harassment if she reported her actions, her subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness, 
or retaliation do not alleviate her duty under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile 
environment"). 
Victoria Johnson may well have subjectively feared that by reporting Friis' s behavior 
to NIC her "I" grade may have been jeopardized or she may have faced other retaliation from Friis, 
but that is not a reasonable excuse for waiting to report the harassment. Johnson has provided to this 
Court no evidence that Friis ever communicated to her in any manner any threat or implication of 
retaliation in any circumstances. As NIC demonstrated on summary judgment, Johnson admitted 
at deposition her fear that her grade would be affected by her responses to Friis's advances was 
entirely her own subjective thought, and she acknowledged Friis neither said nor did anything to give 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 29. 
credence to that fear. Johnson has admitted that these fears of retaliation she had were entirely 
subjective to her, and that Friis never substantiated them through his actions. 
There are some exceptional reasons observed by courts that excuse a plaintiff's delay 
or failure to report. These often include situations where the plaintiff has communicated harassment 
to the employeronce but the employer failed to act, thus making the plaintiff credibly and objectively 
believe that a second report would be futile. Further, some courts have excused a plaintiff's failure 
to timely report harassment on the basis of a credible fear of retaliation. 10 This credible fear "must 
be based on more than the employee's subjective belief," and must be shown by affirmative evidence 
proffered by the plaintiff. This proof must be "evidence that the employer has ignored or resisted 
similar complaints or has taken adverse actions against employees in response to such complaints." 
Cruz v. Liberatore, 582 F.Supp.2d 508, 526-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), citing Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 
239 F.3d 243, 245 (2nd Cir. 2001). 11 Absent this credible threat of retaliation, there is no 
reasonableness in an employee's failure to report based on fear of retaliation (see Weger v. City of 
Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 725 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding "where the alleged harassing supervisor never 
told employee that her job was in jeopardy, nor did he threaten her with physical harm, the employee 
did not reasonably avail herself of the protections afforded by her employer's antiharassment 
policies") quoting Walton v. Johnson, 347 F.3d 1272, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
10However, as explained in the 11th Circuit's decision in Baldwin above, many courts 
will not excuse a delay or failure to report harassment even when there is a credible and 
substantiated fear of retaliation, as Title VII also provides a cause of action to an employee for 
retaliation against an employer who takes an adverse employment action against an employee for 
filing a claim of discrimination under Title VII. 
11Note that in these cases the plaintiff is required to prove the employer-not the 
supervisor-would have retaliated against the employee for reporting harassment. Johnson's 
alleged fears of retaliation are focused solely on Friis. 
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Other similar reasons proffered by plaintiffs for delay in reporting harassment have 
been rejected by courts as unreasonable as a matter of law, including a plaintiff's contention that she 
delayed reporting harassment until she could find a corroborating witness to support her claims 
(Adams v. 0 'Reilly Automotive, Inc., 538 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2008)), and a plaintiff's contention that , 
she did not report sexual harassment to her employer because the employer had not handled her 
unrelated disability discrimination claim to her satisfaction (Holly D. v. Cal. Ins. of Tech., 339 F.3d 
1158 (9th Cir. 2003)). Courts have also rejected an employee's subjective belief that his or her 
report of harassment to the employer would be futile as a reasonable excuse for delay or failure to 
report harassment (Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2001); see 
also Mangrum v. Republic Ind., Inc., 260 F.Supp.2d 1229 (N.D. Ga. 2003)). 12 Given these cases, 
it is clear that only in extraordinary cases will a court excuse a plaintiff's delay or failure to report 
sexual harassment. Johnson has provided no such extraordinary circumstances here, only claiming 
a subjective and unsubstantiated fear of retaliation for her failure to report. 
In her Appellant's Brief, Johnson argues that she was justified in waiting until she 
saw her grade was changed from an "I" to an "F" to report because, upon seeing that, "she had 
'nothing more to lose,' and [] the possibility of receiving a failing grade no longer posed a threat in 
the future." (App. Br., p. 13.) In other words, Johnson appears to argue that it was acceptable for 
her to delay her report of harassment until there was no longer any possibility of retaliation. But this 
argument is no different than claiming a subjective, unsubstantiated fear of retaliation justifies delay 
12Compare these to Johnson's claim that because her counselor and teaching assistant did 
not take action in response to her telling them she felt uncomfortable around Friis that she was 
justified in believing that NIC would take no action if she actually reported his behavior in detail. 
(App. Br., p. 12.) 
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in reporting. In carving the Faragher/Ellerth defense, the U.S. Supreme Court understood well that 
plaintiffs would necessarily have to enter the fray of possible retaliation to report sexual harassment 
in order to be able to hold an employer liable under respondeat superior. Plaintiffs must do so in 
order to assist the employer in stopping presently occurring harassment, a primary goal of Title VII. 
To wait until the path is clear will likely mean-just as it does in this case-that the harassment has 
already ended, and with it the employer's opportunity to stop it. 
b. The Time Johnson Waited to Report Is Significant 
Johnson claims she was first harassed by Friis during the Fall 2001 semester. She 
admits she never reported his actions to any NIC official regarding that alleged harassment until 
January 2005 when she told Judy Bundy. This constitutes a delay of over three years in reporting 
Friis' s conduct. 
Johnson also claims Friis harassed her during the time she was enrolled in his class 
in the Spring 2004 semester. She dropped out of school midway through the semester. Yet she 
again delayed any report to NIC of this harassment until January 2005, constituting a delay of 
between nine months and a year. 
And, Johnson alleges she was harassed by Friis during the summer of 2004, leading 
up to August 20, 2004, when she finally informed Friis his actions were not welcomed. Yet she 
waited until January 2005 to report this as well, a delay of nearly five months. Key here is the fact 
that during these four months Johnson had no contact with Friis and, in fact, had no contact with him 
ever again after that August 20 conversation. Yet still she delayed her report of Friis' s behavior until 
that following January. 
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NIC's antiharassment policy and procedure required Johnson to report any sexually 
harassing behavior within ninety (90) days of the occurrence. Had Johnson complied with this 
requirement in 2001, NIC could have prevented all of Friis' s conduct in 2004. Had Johnson 
complied with this requirement upon again experiencing Friis' s harassment in the Spring 2004 class, 
NIC could have prevented Friis' s conduct during that time period. Instead, Johnson waited until her 
interaction with Friis had come to an end before notifying NIC of the harassment. 
This delay in notifying NIC of Friis' s actions is material, as courts have found that 
the time period of delay in reporting affects the employer's ability to eradicate the harassment before 
it becomes severe or pervasive. See Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1307 (finding that delay of three months 
and two weeks to report was unreasonable); Hardage v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 427 F.3d 1177 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (holding employee's failure to report harassment for six months was unreasonable as a 
matter of law under Faragher); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding plaintiff's failure to report unwelcome conduct until one year after the most recent 
activity and two years after the first incident was unreasonable as a matter oflaw); Roby v. CW/, Inc., 
589 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding five month delay in reporting harassment unreasonable as a 
matter of law); Scrivner v. Socorro /ndep. Sch. Dist., 169 F.3d 969, 972 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding 
eight month delay in reporting harassment was unreasonable); McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 
375 F.3d 762, 773 (9th Cir. 2004) ( observing "if [harasser] had engaged in his harassing conduct for 
months and Mccurdy had not reported him, the ASP would not be liable for [his] harassment"); 
Pinkerton v. Colo. Dept. ofTransp., 563 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a delay of two and 
a half months in reporting harassing behavior was unreasonable under Faragher/Ellerth); and 
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Williams v. Missouri Dept. of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972 (8 th Cir. 2005) (holding a delay of four 
months in reporting was unreasonable). 
The length of Johnson's delay in reporting Friis to NIC is substantial and material to 
the question at hand. Johnson waited over three years to report the harassment that occurred in the 
Fall 2001 semester, and she waited between five months to a year to report the harassment that 
occurred in 2004. Without question she failed to report any harassment within the 90-day window 
required by NIC. This delay is material evidence of the unreasonableness of Johnson's delay, 
particularly where Johnson has not provided any evidence of a valid, substantiated reason why she 
waited so long. 
c. .Johnson's Reason for Reporting Friis Is Inconsistent 
With Title VII 
It is significant that Johnson did not report Friis' s behavior until she mistakenly 
believed he had changed her "I" grade to an "F." This occurred during her meeting with Judy Bundy 
in January 2005 when she was again preparing to re-start classes at NIC. It can be easily surmised 
from these facts that had Johnson not met with Bundy at that time, or had Bundy not looked at 
Johnson's grades during that meeting, Johnson would likely have delayed her reporting of Friis's 
conduct well beyond January 2005. This is easily inferred because this was the second time Johnson 
was trying to re-start her classes at NIC after having dropped out in the middle of a semester. 
Johnson dropped out during the Fall 2001 semester and re-started her classes in January 2004 after 
meeting with her advisor, Judy Beckendorf. At that time, Johnson decided to retake the computer 
class from Friis despite the harassment she claims she received from him in 2001. Johnson made 
no report of Friis' s behavior to NIC upon re-starting classes in 2004, though she claims his behavior 
caused her to drop out of school. Had she not seen the "F" grade in the computer class in January 
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2005, and mistakenly believed that Friis had taken negative action against her by the grade change, 
it is reasonable to believe Johnson would have continued with her education at NIC without 
notifying that school of Friis' s past behavior. After all, Johnson had notified Friis that prior August 
of her rejection of his advances and Friis had complied with her request that he stop contacting her. 
Given the facts of this case, it is apparent that Johnson's decision to report Friis's 
behavior in January 2005 had nothing to do with any attempt to keep Friis from further harassing her. 
Rather, her reason for reporting Friis was because she was upset because she thought he changed her 
grade, and she wanted redress for his actions. In her written complaint of sexual harassment to NIC, 
Johnson stated that "the reason I decided to make a formal complaint is so that I can try and put all 
of this behind me." (R., p. 104.) In telling NIC what she wanted done as a result of her reporting 
Friis's behavior, she stated she would like her grade changed in Friis's computer class and to have 
her financial aid concerns addressed so she could finish her schooling at NIC without having to pay 
for her classes during the Spring 2004 semester. She then stated: "I would like to see the wrongs that 
were done made right, so I can go forward in a positive, empowered, and prideful way once again." 
(R., p. 105.) Johnson says nothing about wanting to report Friis's behavior in order to stop it or to 
prevent it from happening again, and it is clear that by the time Johnson reported Friis' s conduct she 
did not believe she was ever going to interact with him again. She simply wanted to seek 
compensation. 
This is in stark contrast with the principles and purposes of Title VII and the 
Faragher/Ellerth structure of combating sexual harassment. 
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment 
policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer 
liability to depend in part on an employer's effort to create such 
procedures, it would effect Congress's intention to promote 
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conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context. To the 
extent limiting employer liability could encourage employees to 
report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it 
would also serve Title VII's deterrent purposes. As we have 
observed, Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences 
doctrine, and the considerations which animate that doctrine would 
also support the limitation of employer liability in certain 
circumstances. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added). As demonstrated above, the purpose of this system is to 
allow NIC to curb sexually harassing behavior before it rises to the level of discrimination. Johnson 
was not seeking to curb Friis' s behavior in reporting him to NIC; rather, she was seeking recompense 
for his past actions. "[T]he reporting requirement [ of F aragher/Ellerth] serves the primary objective 
of Title VII which is not to provide redress but to avoid harm." Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy 
Corp., 240 F.3d 262,267 (4th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). Johnson filed her report in 2005 to seek 
redress, not to prevent harassment. Her delay in reporting completely deprived NIC of any 
opportunity to prevent further harassment, thus frustrating the very Title VII principles Johnson now 
invokes to seek liability against NIC. 
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting NI C's Motion for Reconsideration 
Johnson asks this Court to find error in the District Court's decision to grant NIC's Motion 
for Reconsideration of the District Court's ruling on summary judgment. Johnson asserts that the 
granting of NIC' s Motion for Reconsideration was wrong because NIC did not present any new or 
additional facts as part of its motion, and thus the District Court abused its discretion in granting the 
motion. (App. Br., pp. 14-16.) This appears to be the sole basis for Johnson's exception to the 
District Court's grant of NIC' s Motion for Reconsideration separate from her arguments relating to 
the F aragher/Ellerth affirmative defense above. This assertion as to a requirement of new evidence 
on a motion for reconsideration is legally without merit. 
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Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure itself says nothing of a requirement 
of new evidence. This Court has long held that "under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a court may reconsider its legal rulings before a final judgment has been entered." 
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68 (1994). In Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468 
(2006), the Idaho Court of Appeals specifically rejected the argument that a motion for 
reconsideration under I.R.C.P. Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) must be accompanied by new evidence, finding: 
[A] rule requiring new evidence on a motion for reconsideration would be a cause for 
concern. It would prevent a party from drawing the court's attention to errors of law 
or fact in the initial decision, precluding correction of even flagrant errors except 
through an appeal. Accordingly, we hold that the absence of new evidence 
accompanying Johnson's motion for reconsideration did not, standing alone, require 
that the motion be denied. 
143 Idaho at 473. The Court of Appeals' rationale in Johnson is sound, where a motion for 
reconsideration under I.R.C.P. Rule ll(a)(2)(B) allows a court to reconsider its rulings throughout 
the course of a case up until 14 days after final judgment, and thus allows the court to ensure its 
rulings are as consistent with the law as possible before the case is subject to appellate review. In 
this way a judge is not immediately bound by any errors made in his or her rulings until that period 
provided for in the rule has passed. Requiring new evidence for such a reconsideration to be made 
would necessarily remove the majority of the scope of possible reconsideration by a court prior to 
appeal. 
Johnson argues that NIC 's Motion for Reconsideration "was simply an attempt to re-submit 
the matter, having had the benefit of the District Court's view of the remaining issues raised in the 
initial Motion for Summary Judgment. ... " (App. Br., p. 15.) Yet had NIC's Motion for 
Reconsideration truly been nothing but the same arguments and authority as had been posed to the 
District Court upon NIC's Motion for Summary Judgment, then it is reasonable to assume the 
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District Court's decision would have been the same-to deny summary judgment again. This was 
plainly not the case, as NIC raised other authority that had not been originally considered on 
summary judgment, and the District Court obviously felt that based on this new authority there were 
sufficient legal errors in the original decision that needed correction, including a full consideration 
of all issues presented in the Motion for Reconsideration. 
It is significant that one error made by the District Court in its summary judgment 
decision-finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Friis had acted within the course and 
scope of his employment at key times during his period of interaction with Johnson-had originally 
been raised by Johnson herself in her brief in opposition to summary judgment. (See R., pp. 256-
257.) Johnson raised the point that any analysis of the course and scope of employment issue was 
subsumed within the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, and thus the District Court was not 
required to make any separate finding as to this issue. Defendant NIC conceded this point in its 
summary judgment reply brief. (R., pp. 264-266.) The District Court nevertheless originally ruled 
in its Memorandum Decision and Order that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
course and scope of employment issue. (R., pp. 280-281.) This error was raised by NIC in its 
Motion for Reconsideration (R., pp. 284-285), and was subsequently corrected by the Court in its 
decision on that motion (January 11, 2011 Decision Tr., pp. 5:3 - 6:3 ). There was no new evidence 
presented as part of this issue, but it was nevertheless important for the District Court to have an 
opportunity to revisit the issue and correct the legal error prior to the case becoming final at the 
District Court level. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons established above, the District Court's grant of summary judgment to NIC 
on Plaintiff's remaining IHRA educational discrimination claim should be affirmed. 
DATED this 20th day of July, 2011. 
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